Is Compatibilism Unhealthy

I wonder if there is a common structure to a number of disparate “old” philosophy debates.

The “old” philosophy debates I am referring to: A- and B-series time Metaethical realism v relativism Scientific realism v instrumentalism Aspects of the objective v subjective divide (including wrt probability… indeed the objective/subjective divide appears to play a role in each of the debates)

I am sure there are more (I shall try to collect them). The “old” is not meant to be pejorative but rather that they have been around for a long time and seemingly continue to be active despite the fact that resolution appears unlikely.

My reply to all of them is compatibilism. Compatibilism in the sense that there are senses in which both sides of the debate offer a kernel of truth or reality.

Typically the original debate involved opposing views that have subsequently been called “naive”. That is both sides of the spectrum under debate are extreme views that are patently false.

The debate continues by pursuing “sophisticated” versions of the original positions. Usually one “sophisticated” side of the debate is taken up at a time, against gestures to the other sides supposedly “sophisticated” version (which in fact is more similar to the “naive” version).

The justification of my compatibilism requires each of these debates to be multi-conceptual (i.e. involving more than one set of concepts at a time). In most of the examples above the second concept appears to be the subjective/objective divide. And the subjective/objective divide is also multi-conceptual—involving notions of absolute truth, access, possibility for error, differing evidential bases…

Now that I write this I wonder if the locus of the problem is in the objective/subjective divide… and how it is variously conceived. What level of doubt is required to make something subjective? What level of certainty, objective?

And, importantly, that the conception of “objectivity/subjectivity” slides with the sophisticated versions of each of the arguments. This is how sophisticated version escapes the patent falsity of the naive version. But in doing so one aspect of the argument is granted to the other side. What keeps the opposing positions alive (to the extent that they are) is the implicit shifting to another criteria of objectivity (subjectivity, depending on your persuasion I shall try to think this through and re-write it another time.

[Adam]

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I like this.

As applied to realism/anti-realism, it’s been written about a lot. I don’t know whether it’s been written about in general. The thing to look at to find out is probably Pragmatism.

One thing in particular is Huw Price’s stuff on Subject Naturalism.

Jason