Seminar Paper Draft 1
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In Mind and World, John Mc Dowell puts forward a strategy for overcoming some past problems/tensions in the philosophy of perception. The way in which he structures this strategy however, points to an interesting metaphilosophical approach influenced by both Wittgenstein and Rorty. From the (minimal) discussion of metaphilosophy that Mc Dowell engages in in the book, it is clear that he sees himself as continuing in the quietist tradition of Wittgenstein. My task in this essay will be to try to extract McDowell’s metaphilosophy and analyse whether Rorty’s influence (or any other aspects) give rise to tensions between McDowell’s approach and Wittgenstein’s. I will begin by outlining the metaphilosophical approaches of Wittgenstein and Rorty (noting that both of their approaches are contrastive ’ the see themselves as replacing ‘traditional’ philosophical methods with new, more justified ones). Next, I will extract McDowell’s metaphysical approach in Mind and World. Following this, I will highlight possible areas of tension between Wittgenstein and Mc Dowell and analyse their significance. Finally, I will discuss why the vagueness inherent in both Wittgenstein and McDowell’s views undermines one’s ability to draw any strict conclusions from such an analysis.
Wittgenstein
- We are concerned here with the metaphilosophy of the Philosophical Investigations
- Traditional philosophy: — The problems of philosophy arise from superficially similar language games — {[green Will need to define ‘language game’ here ]} — Ordinary grammar does not give a clear view of language, in particular it does not give a clear view of use — Traditional philosophy attempts to apply strict and clear linguistic rules where there should be none — This implies that the traditional philosopher wants to alter the rules of expression
- ‘New’ philosophy: — New philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’ — That is, philosophical investigation should never lead to revision of a language game — New philosophy is a form of therapy that treats the ‘anxieties’ raised by traditional philosophy — This is not a one time treatment but an ongoing process by setting up reminders that enable one to avoid a relapse — {[green Could touch on the notion of ‘perspicuous representation’ here ]} — One way in which new philosophy may procede is by comparing surface grammar to depth grammar — Philosophical anxieties can arise when the surface grammar is somehow misleading — {[green Will need to define ‘surface grammar’ and ‘depth grammar’ here ]} — {[green Should also note how little space Wittgenstein devotes to discussing them in the Investigations ]} — {[green An example of this analysis would probably be useful here too ]}
Rorty
- We are concerned here with the metaphilosophy of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
- Traditional philosophy: — trying to find a general epistemelogical foundation — epistemology as the foundation of philosophy — ‘mirroring’ nature — the power of theoretical empirical investigation has made us seek it likeness everywhere
- ‘New’ philosophy: — Acknowledges that there are no general foundations for knowledge — Objectivity really is just an indication of social agreement — Justifications are always local (i.e. intra-discourse) — To put it another way: everything is context-dependent — Rorty sees this as just carrying out the analytic technique of questioning presuppositions more thoroughly than it has been done in the past — Most reasoning takes place within a socially constructed normal discourse — {[green Should define ‘normal discourse’ here ]} — {[green Maybe motivate by way of Kuhn? ]} — {[green Should also highlight the role of history (i.e. through inheritance) in our present normal discourses (maybe better put as ‘the role of history in the construction of context’) ]} — The task of new philosophy then is hermeneutical: to aid in translation between discourses — {[green Should define ‘abnormal discourse’ here ]}
- Mc Dowell*
- Overall, McD is not trying to fully detail a new philosophical theory. Rather he is trying to show a way past an old sticking point. Once he has done that, he is not concerned with proceeding any further down the theory path (which is quite frustrating).
- Anxieties issue from thoughts
- But giving an historical account allows one to justify the choice of problematic thoughts in a way that may gain traction with those suffering from the anxiety — ‘a proposed exorcism is more satisfying to the extent that it enables us to respect, as insights, the driving thoughts of those who take the familiar philosophical anxieties to pose real intellectual obligations’ — Mc Dowell sees these driving thoughts as historical whereas Wittgenstein sees them as primarily linguistic
- In this case: — the rise of modern science provides the historical narrative — {[green should note the influence of Rorty here ]} — from this we get the idea that nature must be equated with the realm of law — this, coupled with the idea that the space of reasons is sui generis leads us into the anxiety — {[green Should note that his argument for the connection between the ideas inherent in the modern scientific viewpoint and the point of view that leads to the anxiety he wants to dispell is not very good. ]} — {[green This however doesn’t affect the attempt to extract metaphilosophy as the interpretation of his general approach is not contingent upon the success of that approach in particular instances. ]}
- McDowell’s aim is to show that we are not forced into the dilemma and hence does not need to deal directly with positions involved in that dilemma, just needs to show the road around.
Tensions
The role of history - Possible interpretations of McD’s use of historical context: - 1. Just a useful tool for discovering assumptions lurking in the background — But fundamentally we are still taking an ahistorical approach to the analysis of these assumptions, once they have been discovered — This seems fairly compatible with Witgenstein, even if it is a technique that he didn’t use (see also ” Non - Linguistic approach” below). - 2. There is no way in which things can be dealt with ahistorically (Marx?) — Thus, even when we analyse the results of our historical investigations in the present day we are subject to the new historical backgournd assumptions of the present day. — This would seem to be a major new component of a metaphilosophy that can’t really be attributed to Wittgenstein. — However, the vagueness in Wittgenstein’s communication of his ideas makes it hard to argue that it contradicts him - 3. There is something in certain objects/events that transcends the relativising impact of history (Gadamer) — Hence, although much analysis is ‘stuck’ within a given historical context, some aspects can be taken and analysed ahistorically — Are the sorts of things McD is interested in among these aspects though? — In any event we again seem to be far beyond anything that can be attributed to Wittgenstein here (the comments on 2 above would apply here too: the vagueness in Wittgenstein’s communication of his ideas makes it hard to argue that it contradicts him) - The main discovery here then is that position 1 doesn’t really involve any more substantial metaphysical (?) claims than Wittgenstein was willing to make, it just reccomends a new technique for ‘therapy’. The other two however, seem much stronger metaphysically which could lead to some tension with Wittgenstein (possibly mitigated by his vagueness).
The use of philosophical language - McD quote: “My diction is often that of traditional philosophy. This is a divergence from Wittgenstein, and it is not an oversight. … If it is feasible to do therapeutic philosophy in traditional language … it might help us make contact with the targets of the therapy.” — Wittgenstein’s main concern seems to be with the confusion inherent in philosophical theories, not language so there is not much of a tension here.
The non-linguistic approach - Seems okay of one takes Wittgenstein’s dictate that there is not a philosophical method to heart. — However, once we are no longer dealing with linguistic analysis is there really much left of Wittgenstein’s views to be at tension with?
Is McD’s approach contrastive? Does it matter? - The metaphilosophies of both Wittgenstein and Rorty are as much defined in terms of what philosophy should not be as what it should. This emphasis on contrast is lost in Mc Dowell - does it cause any tension with Wittgenstein? - The fact that his approach takes place within the discourse of traditional philosophy is key for McDowell. It is this that gives it its power to overcome the anxieties of traditional philosophical views. — How then does McDowell’s approach differ from traditional philosophy? — In some sense it is parasitic upon it. It is only required due to the anxieties that traditional philosophy has raised. — Anxiety arises when philosophical investigation conflicts with common sense. (To put it another way: it arises when philosophy ‘gets stuck’ somewhere that differs from our common sense views.) — McDowell’s approach then is to point out a path around this sticking point in a way that will be ‘memorable’ to those who are tempted to follow the philosophical path that leads to the sticking point. — Surely then at some level Mc Dowell is involved in some form of philosophical theorising? — This does seem to be in conflict with Wittgenstein’s claim that there are no philosophical theories. — However, perhaps McD may argue that there is a distinction between the ‘sketchy’ theories that he puts forward and the ‘full-blooded’ theories of traditional philosophy. — It is extremely difficult to assess the compatibility of such a claim with Wittgenstein’s position without some way of mapping between Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis (in which the prohibitions on philosophical theorising are somewhat more clear) and McDowell’s historical one. — Naturally, such an endeavour is beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
- Overall, Mc Dowell and Wittgenstein differ in their idea of what constitute the driving thoughts of philosophical theories. McDowell, under the influence of Rorty, takes them to be historical, Wittgenstein linguistic. It is this that leads to the difference in their therapy strategies. — And the way in which history is to be used (unclear in McD) has significant implications for the compatability of the two theories.
- Fogelin: it is a mistake to try and extract a general metaphilosophical method from the Investigations. What Wittgenstein was actually doing was just discussing some general features of his approaches to particular problems, not dictating a metaphilosophical method. — Although there is a bit of tension here with Wittgenstein’s claim that there can be no philosophical theories ’ this seems to rule out a lot of possible therapeutic avenues. — However, Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no one philosophical method seems to lend some support to the compatability of McDowell’s altered approach.
- Wouldn’t a fully developed theory provide an even better therapy than McDowell’s sketches? — This would definitely be in conflict with Wittgenstein though. — But it doesn’t seem all that dramatic a change to McDowell’s approach. Perhaps this serves to highlight that they are quite different views?
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Questions for Bruin
- Have I read the right bits of ‘Mirror of Nature’? Also, did Rorty’s metaphilosophical views change? (Do I need to read any more recent Rorty?)
- Any other good sources for McDowell’s metaphilosophy?
- Is PI-era Wittgenstein the right Wittgenstein to use here?
- Should I engage in any general criticism of Wittgenstein and Rorty’s views?
- Is my characterisation of the ‘sketchy’ nature of McDowell’s argument and his reasons for it fair?
- I’m a little shaky on the Gadamer and history stuff, is there anything more I should know/read for present purposes?
- Is ‘common sense’ the correct way to describe what traditional philosophy is at tension with when we have an ‘anxiety’?
- Overall: — Are my characterisations accurate? — Is there anything else I need to read? — Are there any glaring flaws in my arguments?
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